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INSURANCE AS COMMERCE
FIVE YEARS UNDER THE SEUA DECISION'
By AusTm J. ILLY*
Since time whereof the memory of today's man runneth
not to the contrary, that is to say, for the better part of
more than 100 years, the business of insurance in the United
States has been subject to state regulation. As insurance
goes, one hundred years is a substantial period in its United
States history. The first insurance department has not yet
celebrated its 100th birthday. In insurance history, as such,
one hundred years is merely a whipstitch.
The early origin of insurance is wrapped in the mists of
antiquity.' Operations conducted by a mutual insurance
organization are recorded as early as 1375. Notwithstanding
that Lord Coke in 1588 "notices the practice as a novelty",
* Of the Baltimore City Bar, General Counsel, Maryland Casualty Com-
pany, Baltimore. LLB. University of Maryland 1907. The following article
is based upon, and to a large extent follows, textually, a paper read before
the Barristers' Club of Baltimore, October 25, 1949. Grateful acknowledg-
ment is extended, In particular, to John M. McFall, Vice President and Chief
Attorney of United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company of Baltimore;
J. Dewey Dorsett and Ray Murphy, General Manager and General Counsel,
respectively, of the Association of Casualty & Surety Companies of New
York; and James B. Donovan, Counsel of the National Bureau of Casualty
Underwriters of New York; whose writings and whose thoughtful and
constructive contributions to the discussion and settlement of the out-
standing problems of first instance created by SEUA, freely availed of by
the writer of this paper, have been of invaluable assistance to the insurance
industry. Mr. Donovan has recently completed a further well-documented
study entitled "Insurance Becomes Commerce" In two articles, the first
of which was published in the Insurance Council Journal, April, 1950,
at page 141.
1U. S. v. South Eastern Underwriters Association, et al., 822 U. S. 533
(1944), reversing 51 F. Supp. 712 (1943) ; and designated popularly as
"SEUA" or "S.E.U.A."
For data (some of which are controversial from the historical stand-
point) in this paragraph and the two next following paragraphs, see Joycs,
INSUuANcz, (2d Ed., 1917), Vol. 1, Preliminary Ch.
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there are facts from which it is deduced that maritime in-
surance was in use from the very remote ages by the Greeks,
Romans and other nations, and formed the traditionary
ground-work of the insurance system as we know it today.
The practice'of insurance grew up probably as naturally in
the face of need for it as did matrimony, and with just about
as little history of the individual early transaction as of the
individual marriage. From the date of the earliest reported
case, in 1588, down to 1756, there are believed to be not
more than 60 reported decisions upon insurance.
Fire insurance, as we know it now, was a going business
in 1609. It began to function in the United States about
1724. Life insurance, which had its modern beginnings in
the 16th Century, was manifest in the United States as early
as 1759, but the first general life company was the Penn-
sylvania Company for Insurance Upon Lives and Granting
Annuities, chartered in 1812. Accident insurance, originally
relating only to railway accidents, was established in Lon-
don in 1849. In 1856, it was extended to embrace accidents
of all kinds. The Travelers, of Hartford, Conn., 1863, is
credited with the distinction of being the first accident in-
surance company in the United States. Casualty insurance
(using the term generally) existed in Hartford, Connecti-
cut, operating through a chartered company, in 1866; Plate
Glass, in New Jersey in 1868. Liability insurance, one of
the great branches of the casualty field, was initiated in
England through the Employers' Liability Assurance Cor-
poration of London in 1880, following the enactment of the
Employers' Liability Act of that year. It seems to have
come to America in 1887.
Fidelity and Guaranty insurance had its modern begin-
nings in London in 1720. It was first introduced in the
United States through the Guaranty Company of North
America, a Canadian corporation, abortive. The Knicker-
bocker Casualty Company of New York was the first United
States company to write these lines - chartered in 1875.
It was authorized by statute in 1880 to change its name to
the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York.
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Workmen's Compensation insurance in the United States
is a creature of the Twentieth Century.
Insurance is a business that has grown by leaps and
bounds. Judge Gontrum tells us that when Paul v. Vir-
ginia4 was decided, in 1869, the assets of the business in
our country amounted to approximately $303,000,000.00, or
about 1% of the national wealth. Some seventy years later,
insurance assets, securing its obligation to some 60 million
policyholders, amounted in round figures to some forty-six
billion dollars, or 15% of the national wealth. As of today,
the figures have further substantially increased.
This growth occurred during approximately 100 years
of state regulation, as sustained early in the period by Paul
v. Virginia.' In that case, the issues of regulation as between
the Federal Government and the States merged into a
frontal attack (inspired, mirabile dictu, by the insurance
interests) against state regulation in the 60's. It culminated
in a victory for the States. The State of Virginia had en-
acted a statute pursuant to which foreign insurance com-
panies were required to obtain licenses to transact business
therein. As a condition precedent to the issuance of the
license, the foreign company was required to make, as a
guaranty of the performance of its obligations, a deposit
with the State Treasurer. The plaintiff, Paul, a resident of
Virginia, applied for a license as an agent for several New
York fire insurance companies. The license was denied
because the companies refused to post the deposit. Paul
proceeded nevertheless to write a policy of insurance. He
was arrested, convicted and fined $50. A writ of supersedeas
was denied by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,
and by writ of error the case was taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States, on the ground that the Virginia
statute, since it controlled or attempted to control the
admission of foreign insurance companies, was in violation
of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United
'The Hon. John B. Gontrum, Glen Arm, Baltimore County, Maryland,
Insurance Commissioner of Maryland from May, 1939 to September, 1943,
when he resigned to accept an appointment as Judge of the Third Judicial
Circuit of Maryland, sitting at Towson.
'75 U. S. 168 (1869). See also, infra, n. 10.
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States, which gives to Congress the exclusive power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states."
The Supreme Court held that the Virginia statute did
not interfere with the exclusive power of Congress to
regulate commerce among the states, because insurance is
not commerce. The court reduced the matter apparently to
its fundamentals. It said:
"Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce. The policies are simple contracts of in-
demnity.... These contracts are not articles of com-
merce, in any proper meaning of the word. They are
not subjects of trade and barter offered . . . as some-
thing having existence and value independent of the
parties to them.... They are like other personal con-
tracts between parties which are completed by their
signature and the transfer of the consideration. Such
contracts are not interstate transactions though the
parties may be domiciled in different states.. .. "
Accordingly, the states were free to act in the regula-
tion of insurance under their inherent powers recognized
and expressed in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion, which limited the grant of powers therein contained
by providing that the "powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people".
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court decided, in
the case of Hooper v. California,' that the business of mari-
time insurance was not commerce. In 1900, it decided, in
the case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Cravens,7 that
the business of life insurance was not commerce. In 1913, in
the case of New York Life Insurance Co. v. Deer Lodge
County,8 which dealt with the imposition of a tax by Deer
Lodge County, Montana, against the New York company,
the Supreme Court decided that "The number of transac-
tions does not give the business any other character than
magnitude". In this case the Insurance Company contended
s U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8.
155 U. S. 648 (1895).
'178 U. S. 389 (1900).
231 U. S. 495, 509 (1913).
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that the county could not so tax it, sought a reversal of
Paul v. Virginia, and cited in support of its contention
numerous cases which, even in that comparatively early
day, illustrated the trend of the Court toward the exten-
sion of the interstate commerce field, for instance, in respect
of the regulation of maximum work hours for such railroad
employees as train dispatchers and telegraphers, intrastate
rates of interstate carriers where the effect of the rates
was to "burden" interstate commerce, the activities of local
grain exchanges shown to have an injurious effect on in-
terstate commerce, the production of coal as it related to
the maintenance of wages for union labor.10
Nevertheless, Justice McKenna, who delivered the
opinion of the Court, stood firm. After consideration of the
historical background which led up to Paul v. Virginia and
substantially culminated for his purpose in Hooper v. Cali-
fornia, Justice McKenna said:
"If we consider these cases numerically, the deliber-
ation of their reasoning, and the time they cover, they
constitute a formidable body of authority and strongly
invoke the sanction of the rule of stare decisis."11
In this setting, SEUA was decided. 2 On November 20,
1942, an indictment was returned by a grand jury for the
District Court of the Northern District of Georgia against
198 corporations and 27 individuals, charging them with a
conspiracy to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competi-
tive rates on fire insurance sold by them in the States of
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina
and Virginia, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act' s and with conspiracy to monopolize trade and
commerce in fire insurance in said states, in violation of
S9upra, n. 4.
10 See also Judge Gontrum's "Paul v. Virginia - A Review of the Past and
a Look into the Future", a paper read before the General Session, Section of
Insurance Law, A.B.A., Chicago, 8-25-43 (Proceedings of the Section, p. 15) ;
and before the Mid-Year Meeting of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, New York, 11-30-43; while he was Insurance Commissioner
of Maryland. This paper was widely noted in the current Insurance Press
and is also available in pamphlet form.
Supra, n. 8.
Supra, n. 1.
15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1-7, 15 (1890).
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Section 2 of that Act. The case was heard on demurrer,
which the Trial Court sustained. Judge E. M. Underwood,
relying upon Paul v. Virginia and the supporting cases
which followed it, agreed with counsel for the defendants
that since insurance was not commerce it could not be in-
terstate commerce and, accordingly, the United States had
failed to state a case.14
On August 30, 1943, the United States filed a petition
for appeal to the Supreme Court.15 A brief on behalf of
thirty-four states, as amici curiae, was filed, in which the
Attorneys General thereof asserted, inter alia, that "the
question involved is whether or not this Court would deny
the right to the states to supervise the business of fire in-
surance as conducted within their borders, strike down
the present nation-wide system of state regulation and
supervision, and substitute . . . federal regulation and
supervision" therefor.
The Attorneys General pointed out that:
"A reversal by this court of its previous rulings that
such business is not interstate commerce would bring
the business under the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution and the laws enacted pursuant thereto includ-
ing both the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act and other acts as well... and make neces-
sary a drastic and unwarranted readjustment by the
states of their policies with reference to the business
of fire insurance.
"The proper determination of this question is of
such vital interest and importance to the several States
and to their citizens that it was determined to file this
brief as amici curiae requesting that the decision of
the Lower Court be affirmed."' 16
On June 5, 1944, the Supreme Court in a four to three
decision reversed the trial court and remanded the case for
a trial on its merits. 7 Pursuant to the majority opinion, fire
insurance transactions which stretch across state lines con-
" U. S. v. Southeastern Underwriters Association, et al., 51 Fed. Supp.
712 (1943).
Supra,, n. 1.
Supra, n. 1.
IT Trial on the merits was never had.
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stitute interstate commerce and the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act (under which the indictment was filed) was intended to
apply to the fire insurance business. Justices Reed and
Roberts did not sit. Chief Justice Stone, Justice Jackson
(in part) and Justice Frankfurter dissented.
A petition for rehearing was denied. Forty-one states
petitioned the Supreme Court to grant the rehearing on
the ground that: the Court, in holding that insurance is
interstate commerce and is subject to the Sherman Act, has
destroyed the foundation upon which state regulation is
based.
Fire insurance in its principles does not differ from any
other regular type of insurance. Accordingly, as a result
of the SEUA decision, the insurance business in respect of
its cooperative rating operations pursuant to which the
price to be charged for insurance is determined under
state regulation, commission control, and other cooperative
features, faced a rather gloomy prospect. The States them-
selves, a while back, had feared the effects of cooperation
amongst the insurers for the determination of rates, and
had so hampered it that the unhappy ensuing situation was
investigated by the so-called Merritt Committee in New
York some 40 years ago. The result of its findings submitted
in 1911 was an approval of cooperative ratemaking, on the
theory that unrestricted price competition was a danger to
the continued existence of the smaller companies. As was
said by the Honorable James F. Malone, Jr., then Insurance
Commissioner of Pennsylvania, in 1948:
"The stock fire insurance business [read any insur-
ance business] found it desirable and even necessary
to form the various rating organizations, trade organi-
zations, and to adopt the practices and to formulate the
rules which have occasioned most of the comments and
criticisms."18
From this necessity, cooperation was carried to the point,
for instance, of dictating the number of agents which a com-
pany might have in a certain territory, the amount of com-
""The Insurance Business and Administrative Law: The Shift From
Self-Regulation" by James F. Malone, Jr.: Proceedings of the Section of
Insurance Law at Seattle (Washington, 1948), p. 44 at p. 46.
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missions to be paid agents and brokers, of forbidding agents
located outside of highly competitive and tightly regulated
areas to write business in such areas, and the like. All of
which, insurance men being only human, led to evasions
which led to further rules, so that, as Mr. Malone puts it,
"the problem of enforcement grew until in a few locali-
ties the local producers' organization was vested with
powers ordinarily not found outside Government. .. ."
It was such a business, so operated, grown old in the
process of governing itself as insurance principles and
economics dictated, under constant pressure of expedients
dictated by competition, fostered by selfishness and en-
forced by almost unlimited power, that found itself by vir-
tue of SEUA subject for the first time to the impact of
Federal Anti-Trust legislation, i.e.,
1. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 9 which forbids com-
binations in restraint of trade, and monopolies;
2. The Clayton Act,2" which further implements the
Sherman Act;
3. The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act,2'
which prohibits certain discriminations, rebates and
payments of commissions to brokers (the application
of which to the business of insurance is not certain
but in 1944 was greatly to be feared); and
4. The Federal Trade Commission Act,22 which declares
unfair methods of competition and unfair, deceptive
acts or practices to be unlawful, with FTC determin-
ing the nature of the acts complained of.
The business of insurance was in a dither. As a matter
of fact, it had become so ditherish in 1943 that, after the
U. S. appeal from the Georgia decision, there were intro-
duced in Congress, on September 20, companion bills ex-
empting insurance from the Sherman and the Clayton Acts,
the Walter-Hancock Bill,23 and the Bailey-Van-Nuys Bill.24
,915 U. S. C. A. Secs. 1-7.
15 U. S. C. A. Sees. 12-27.
15 U. S. C. A. Sees. 13, 13a, 13b, 21a.
15 U. S. C. A. Secs. 41-56.
2H. R. 3270.
2, Sen. No. 1362.
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On June 22, 1944, the House passed the Walter-Hancock Bill.
On June 23, 1944, the Attorney General of the United States
recorded himself in the Congressional Record as intending
to take no action against the companies until the States,
the Companies and the Federal Government should have
had an opportunity to determine upon their course of action.
Next, still in 1944, the Executive Committee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted
a program embodying four specific recommendations:
(a) Declaration by Congress that the regulation and
taxation of the insurance business shall continue
in the several states;
(b) Complete elimination of the insurance business
from the Federal Trade Commission Act;
(c) Complete elimination of the insurance business from
the Robinson-Patman Act; and
(d) Partial elimination of the insurance business from
the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Meanwhile, the Senate Judiciary Committee, by a
divided vote, recommended the passage of the Bailey-Van-
Nuys Bill. As to this bill and its House counterpart, the
going became rough when it was realized that enactment
would exempt the heady business of insurance from the
application of the Anti-Trust Laws, without qualification.
Facing this rather stony fact, representatives of the Insur-
ance Commissioners and the Insurance Industry agreed
upon a compromise measure, the McCarran Act, so-called-
which after protracted negotiation was enacted as Public
Law 15, of the 79th Congress of the United States, and was
approved by the President on March 9, 1945.25 In summary,
it provides that:
2115 U. S. C. A. Sees. 1101-1115. The text of the Act Is:
AN ACT
TO EXPRESS THE INTENT OF THE CONGRESS WITH REFERENCE TO THE
REGULATION OF THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House o1 Representatives of the
United States of Anwrica in Congress assembled, That the Congress
hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is In the public Interest, and
that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to Im-
1950]
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(a) Regulation and taxation by the states of the business
of insurance is in the public interest; and silence of
Congress shall be no barrier.
(b) The business shall be subject to state laws which
regulate and tax it.
(c) No act of Congress, unless it refer specifically to
Insurance, shall invalidate any such state law:
PRoVIDED, that after January 1, 1948 [later extended
to June 30, 1948] the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be
applicable to Insurance, to the extent that Insurance
is not regulated by state law.
(d) Until January 1, 1948 [later extended to June 30,
1948] the aforesaid Acts and the Robinson-Patman
Act shall not apply to Insurance.
pose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the
several States.
Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged there-
in, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating
the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such
business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insur-
ance: Provided, That after January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890,
as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15,
1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September
26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall
,be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such busi-
ness is not regulated by State law.
Sec. 3. (a) Until January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known
as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the Act of June
19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall
not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act
inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act
of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.
Sec. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall 'be construed to affect in
any manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act of
July 5, 1935, as amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act,
or the Act of June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, or the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Mer-
chant Marine Act, 1920.
Sec. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several
States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such pro-
vision to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the re-
mainder of the Act, and the application of such provision to persons
or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall
not be affected.
For an outline history of the genesis of Pub. Law 15, see McFALL:
CALENDAR OF THE S.E.U.A. CASE, Insur. Law J. (Feb., 1945) 72; "The Insur-
ance Case to Date", Commercial Law J. (April, 1945) 91; and "The Case for
the All-Industry Bill", in pamphlet form (Dec., 1946).
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(e) The Sherman Act shall continue to apply to boycott,
coercion and intimidation.
(f) This Act shall not affect the application of the
National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, or the Merchant Marine Act of 1920.
The significant difference between the earlier bills and
the McCarran Act is that under the former, Insurance was
exempted from the Federal Anti-Trust and related Acts;
whereas under the latter (now Public Law 15, as aforesaid)
it shall be exempt only to the extent that the business is
regulated by state law: with no exemption whatsoever of
agreements or acts of boycott, intimidation or coercion!
This bit of legislation is unique in the history of the
United States. So far as I know, it has no parallel. Never-
theless, its enactment constituted the winning of merely
the first (and possibly inconclusive) round in the battle
for preserving the existing pattern for control of the insur-
ance business.
The insurance laws of the states and territories of the
United States, including the District of Columbia, were
sufficient for the operation of the business before it had
obtained the highly undesirable status of commerce. But,
insofar as they might be expected to constitute a shield
against anti-trust prosecutions, they presented a maze of
inconsistencies. The insurance business itself, in its two
main subdivisions of stock and mutual, in its minor sub-
divisions, in its rating and administrative organizations
with their consequential fringes of independent operators,
consisted of an almost unintelligible conflict of interests.
This was the material which had to be worked into some
degree of harmony if the great objective of continued state
control, as represented by coordinated operations and rate-
making, offered by the McCarran Act, was to be attained.
The first step toward its attainment was the organiza-
tion in May, 1945, at a joint meeting of the Federal Legisla-
tion Commission of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and outstanding representatives of the in-*
surance companies, of a committee designated as the All-
19501
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Industry Committee. 26 Cooperating with the Industry was
a special committee of the Insurance Section of the Ameri-
can Bar Association, appointed in 1946.27 This committee
not only rendered invaluable constructive assistance, but it
undertook and has carried out effectively the task of keep-
ing the Industry informed of developments and progress.
The mountainous All-Industry Committee labored and
brought forth the draft of two monumental pieces of legis-
lation for enactment by the States, identified as the Casualty
and Surety Rate Regulatory Bill, and the Fire, Marine and
Inland Marine Rate Regulatory Bill,27a which provide for
state supervision of rating activities for various types of
property insurance, casualty insurance and surety insur-
ance. The bills provide that rates must conform to pre-
scribed standards; that they shall not be excessive, inade-
quate or unfairly discriminatory; that rate manuals and
plans shall be filed with the Insurance Commissioner, who
is directed to review such filings as soon as reasonably
possible; that such rates may not be used for a waiting
Representing a complete cross section of the U. S. Insurance World,
this Committee is composed of: American Institute of Marine Underwriters,
American Life Convention, American Mutual Alliance, American Reciprocal
Association, Associated Factory Mutual Fire Insurance Companies, Associa-
tion of Casualty and Surety Companies, Bureau of Personal Accident and
Health Underwriters, Health and Accident Underwriters Conference, Inland
Marine Underwriters Association, Insurance Executives Association, Life
Insurance Association of America, National Association of Casualty and
Surety Agents, National Association of Independent Insurers, National
Association of Insurance Agents, National Association of Insurance Brokers,
National Association of Mutual Insurance Agents, National Board of Fire
Underwriters, National Fraternal Congress of America, and Surety Associa-
tion of America.
'7 The membership of this Committee, somewhat enlarged, and as presently
constituted is: John V. Bloys, Chairman (New York), Orville F. Grahame,
Vice Chairman (Massachusetts), V. J. Skutt, Vice Chairman (Nebraska),
Marcus Abramson (New York), Hon. Sterling Alexander (Iowa), Hale
Anderson, Jr. (Connecticut), Joseph B. Beach (Wisconsin), J. Raymond
Berry (New York), Hon. Robert E. Dineen (New York), James B. Donovan
(New York), Robert L. Hogg (Illinois), B. L. Holland (Connecticut), Hon.
Donald Knowlton (New Hampshire), Hon. James F. Malone, Jr. (Penn-
sylvania), Henry W. Nichols (New York), Prof. Edwin W. Patterson (New
York), W. Lee Shield (Illinois) and J. Donald Whelehan (New York).
Included amongst its original members were: Hon. Maynard Garrison
(San Francisco, Calif.), Henry S. Moser, Vice Chairman (Chicago, Ill.),
Elmer Warren Sawyer, Chairman (New York, N. Y.), Chase M. Smith, Vice
Chairman (Chicago, Ill.).
17 For a discussion of these rate regulatory bills and a report of legisla-
tive action, see MURPHY: PunLic LAW 15 AND ,STATE RE uLA IoN, particu-
larly fns. 7-10, 13ff; Proceedings of the Section of Insurance Law, A.B.A.
(Cleveland, 1947) 9; and GAILDNER: INSURANCE AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS-
A PROBLEM iN SYNTHEss, 61 Harvard L. Rev. (1948) 246.
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period of 15 days or, if extended by the Insurance Commis-
sioner, 30 days; and that if not disapproved within such
waiting period they must be considered to meet the require-
ments of the Act; and shall be available to all subscribers.
In addition, the All-Industry Committee prepared the drafts
of bills relating to unfair methods of competition and unfair
and deceptive practices in the business of insurance, with
the design of clearly providing a type of state regulation
which, within the field of its operation, would make un-
necessary regulation under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act; and an Accident and Health Insurance Bill which,
because of the peculiar nature of that business, related not
only to rates but to applications, riders, endorsements and
classifications of risks. All this material was submitted to
the States, accompanied by recommendations that the State
consider as part of its legislative program, statutory lan-
guage broad enough to permit the payment of commissions
to brokers and to provide for licensing of brokers in order
to meet any possible application to insurance of the Robin-
son-Patman Act, which prohibits discrimination in com-
modity transactions and might prohibit the payment of
commissions to insurance brokers under certain circum-
stances;2" and to provide for the plugging of other loopholes.
Many states, of course, already had laws adequate to cer-
tain of these ends.
I shall not go into detail to show the effort, and the con-
flicts that grew out of the effort, to procure the enactment
by the individual States of this massive legislative program.
Suffice it to say that the two measures of outstanding
importance, relating to rate regulation (the Fire and Marine
and the Casualty and Surety rate laws - the primary shield
against the application to these insurances of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Act) have been enacted in
every state except Idaho,29 and enacted also in the District
of Columbia and the several Territories - either in form
"The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act is an amendment to the
Clayton Act, and is possibly included in the words "as amended" appearing
in Pub. Law 15. In any event, state legislation is designed to eliminate
putative violations.
, Idaho now has the Fire and Marine Act. (Idaho Acts (1947), Ch. 246,
amended by Idaho Acts (1949), Ch. 651).
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as drafted by the All-Industry Committee, or in substance
believed to be sufficient.
The sequelae are in the making.
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,3" the Pruden-
tial protested an annual tax levied by South Carolina on
foreign insurers, but not on domestic companies, as a con-
dition of being authorized to do business within the state.
The tax amounts to 3% of the aggregate of the premiums
received by foreign insurers from the business done in
South Carolina regardless of its interstate or local char-
acter. The Prudential contended that the tax was an uncon-
stitutional discrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of local business. The Supreme Court gave effect to
the positive expression in the McCarran Act that "the con-
tinued regulation and taxation by the several states of the
business of insurance" is in accord with the policy of Con-
gress, and rejected the argument of Prudential that the
Commerce Clause "of its own force" and without reference
to any action by Congress forbids discriminatory state taxa-
tion. The Court further strengthened today's position of
the business under the McCarran Act by finding it was the
intention of Congress "to put the full weight of its power
behind existing and future state legislation to sustain it
from any attack under the Commerce Clause to whatever
extent this may be done with the force of that power behind
it, subject only to the exceptions expressly provided."'"
In Robertson v. California32 (decided at the same term),
the appellant had been convicted in California of the crimes
of (a) soliciting and selling a policy of insurance without
being licensed as required by law, and (b) acting without
a license as an agent for a non-admitted insurer, in viola-
tion of California's applicable statutes. The insurer was an
Arizona corporation, not licensed in California. Its business
was transacted largely by radio advertising and the use of
the mails, in addition to the use of such local agents as the
appellant. Appellant's contention was that since the entire
series of acts (undisputed) done by him was directed to
328 U. S. 408 (1946).
Ibid, 431, et seq.
328 U. S. 440 (1946).
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the consummation of interstate transactions, the acts com-
plained of, though taking place in California, were beyond
the reach of the State's licensing and regulatory powers.
The court rejected these contentions and sustained both
California statutes. In the concluding paragraph of its
opinion, the Court said:
"Our determination has been made without specific
reliance upon the McCarran Act for two reasons. One
is that this was not necessary. The other arises from
the facts that this is a criminal proceeding, the appel-
lant's acts . . . were committed in August following
the rendition of the South-Eastern decision in June of
1944 and the McCarran Act was not approved until
March 9, 1945. The effect of that statute we have con-
sidered in the Prudential Insurance Company case de-
cided today [supra] but that case involved no criminal
or penal phase and therefore no conceivable ex postfacto effect. It is doubtful that more than the semblance
of such an effect would be involved by reliance upon
the [McCarran] Act in this case. . . Its effect might
reasonably be taken as merely declaring or confirming
expressly the inference which would be indicated from
Congress' silence entirely without reference to the
Act's provisions .... It does not detract from our de-
cision on other grounds that the McCarran Act, if
applied, would dictate the same result."
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part, on the ground that
prior to the McCarran Act, California could not (he says)
"under our decisions under the Commerce Clause exclude
interstate business, at least in the absence of a showing that
it was a fraudulent enterprise or in an unsound condition.
No such showing is made here. The McCarran Act changes
that rule; but it should not be allowed to make unlawful
what was lawful when done."
An issue fraught with potential danger to the continu-
ance of full state regulation is found in the case of North
Little Rock Transportation Company, Inc. v. The Casualty
Reciprocal Exchange,3 in the District Court for the Eastern
1085 Fed. Supp. 961 (1949). (The District Court was upheld by a unani-
mous decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit on April
6, 1950 - N. Y. Journal of Commerce, Apr. 7, 1950.)
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District of Arkansas, Western Division. The facts illustrate
just one more complication of the business. A taxicab com-
pany sought automobile liability insurance, which in law
it was compelled to have, and was unable to obtain it on a
voluntary basis because of its bad experience. Pursuant to
an established routine, the application was referred to a
statutory entity designated as the Arkansas Automobile
Assigned Risk Plan, created for the purpose of absorbing
risks which were compelled by law to obtain insurance and
which were unable to arrange for it on a voluntary basis.
The risk was assigned to the Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company. Rate difficulties developed and the taxicab com-
pany brought its action, asking for triple damages and cer-
tain injunctive relief, against the Casualty Reciprocal Ex-
change (its previous insurer), the National Bureau of
Casualty Underwriters, and some fifty casualty insurance
companies - all doing business in Arkansas. The plaintiff's
contention was that the conduct of the defendants in han-
dling the risk and promulgating rates therefor constituted
a pattern of action, followed under contract or conspiracy
between them, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states; and that the McCarran Act is unconstitu-
tional in that Congress may not delegate to individual states
the power to legislate within the Commerce Clause and
cannot suspend general laws for a period of time except
under its war powers. The Court decided against the plain-
tiff on all issues, and on appeal, was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The SEUA decision and the McCarran Act have been
appraised by other courts also,3 4 and the principal conclu-
sions arrived at appear to be that, in general, the right of
the states to regulate and to tax the insurance business
continues to exist. A brief reference may be made to the
interesting fact that there are fields, however, in which the
insurance industry, by virtue of its SEUA status as com-
merce, is not protected by the McCarran Act. For instance,
s See, DONOVAN: THE NEv ERA OF CASUALTY RATE REGULATION, 34; Pro-
ceedings of the Casualty Actuarial Society (1947) 63, ns. 40 and 41.
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it continues, as stated above, to be subject to the Wage and
Hour Law3" and the National Labor Relations Act."
Mail order insurance business is still subject to Federal
regulation. 7 In this connection, it must be borne in mind
that the McCarran Act constitutes a shield against the
designated Federal statutes only, and then only to the
extent that the states can and do affirmatively regulate the
business. The State has no authority to regulate the mails.
The subject of insurance investments constitutes a prob-
lem which we were informed will be injected into the
monopoly inquiry instituted by the House Judiciary Sub-
committee.38  There are borderline fields of Federal au-
thority, questions arising in which must sooner or later
be determined by litigation or legislation. 9
"'The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended, 29 U. S. C. A., Secs.
201-219.
The National Labor Relations Act, 50 U. S. C. A., Secs. 451-462.
This is correct as a broad general statement. However, fourteen states
have attempted to deal. with the problem by the enactment of the Unau-
thorized Insurers Process Act (for instance, Md. Acts (1949), Ch. 450), and
twenty-four states by the enactment of Fair Trade Practices Acts (for in-
stance, Md. Acts (1947), Ch. 757). These laws taken together may have
the hoped for effect of diminishing the area of Federal regulation of mail
order insurance. For a full discussion of the problem, see Regulation of
Mail Order Accident and Health Insurance, by George H. Kline, Insurance
Research Analyst (presently Deputy Superintendent) of the New York
State Insurance Department, as submitted to the annual meeting of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, at Seattle, Washington,
June, 1949, by Robert E. Dineen, Superintendent of Insurance of New York,
published by the New York Insurance Department in pamphlet form; and
Report of Insurance Status Committee of the American Bar Association,
The Fifth Year of Insurance as Interstate Commerce; Proceedings of the
Section of Insurance Law, A.B.A., Chicago, 1949, p. 273. See also a resumd
of insurance activities in Washington, D. C., presented by Harry F. Perlet,
Assistant Manager, Insurance Department, Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, at the annual meeting (1949) of the National Association
of Independent Insurers (Insurance Advocate (Nov. 12, 1949) 5). See also
Travelers Health Assn., et al. v. Commonwealth, 51 S. E. 2d 263 (Va. 1949);
now on appeal in the Supreme Court of the United States.
Insurance Field, 12-2-1949, p. 5.
9 Senator McCarran himself has described the potential situation more
forcibly :
"I think It would be appropriate to quote here from the dissenting
opinion of the late Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in that case [SEUA, 8upra,
n. 1], where, discussing the magnitude of this problem, he declared
that the action of the Supreme Court-
'in now overturning the precedents of 75 years, governing a busi-
ness of such volume and of such wide ramifications, cannot fail to
be occasion for loosing a flood of litigation and of legislation, state
and national, in order to establish a new boundary between state
and national power raising questions which cannot be answered
for years to come, during which a .great business and the regulatory
officers of every state must be harassed by all the doubts and diffi-
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We may all be sure that the McCarran Act and the state
legislation enacted pursuant thereto do not say the final
word. Superintendent Dineen, of New York, has stated,
rather cogently, that:
"Every commissioner knows that Congress now has
the power at least insofar as the field of interstate
commerce is concerned to take over the regulation of
the insurance business and that state regulation must
now prove its mettle."4
Former Commissioner Malone, of Pennsylvania, follow-
ing upon comments in respect of the application of the
Federal Trade Commission Act to the business, goes on
to say:-41
"There can be no doubt that Congress will keep a
watchful eye on everything that is done by all con-
cerned."
These views are shared by many.
Nevertheless, there is encouragement and perhaps the
faint shadow of a semi-wishful prophecy in the words of
Senator Joseph F. O'Mahoney, of Wyoming, penned when
the McCarran Act was still, so to speak, in swaddling
clothes. He wrote: 42
culties inseparable from a realignment of the distribution of power
in our federal system.'
"That is a strong and forthright and forceful statement; but I want
to say to you, with all the emphasis at my command, that there is no
word of overstatement in it." (Congress and Federal Regulation of
Insurance, by Senator Pat McCarran, Proceedings of the Section of
Insurance Law, A.B.A., Cleveland, Ohio, 1947, p. 29 at p. 30.) See also
Some procedural and Administrative Questions Arising Under Laws
Resulting from Public Law 15". W. Lee Shield, Proceedings of Section
of Insurance Law, A.B.A., St. Louis, 1949, p. 233. [The Federal Trade
Commission completed in April, 1950, a factual survey of state, dis-
trict and territorial insurance laws which may affect the application
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the Clayton
Act, as amended, to the business of insurance. The survey is avail-
able for inspection at the office of F. T. C.]
,0 The AIC Bills and the Alternatives, an address delivered by the Hon.
Robert E. Dineen, Supt. of Insurance of the State of New York, before the
National Association of Independent Insurers, at Chicago, October 14, 1946.
,1 See The Insurance Business and Administrative Law: The Shift From
Self-Regulation, by James F. Malone, Jr., [then Insurance Commissioner
of Pennsylvania] : Proceedings of the Section of Insurance Law, A.B.A., at
Seattle, Washington, 1948, p. 44 ff.
"Government and the Business of Insurance, The Casualty and Surety
J. (Jan. 1946) 9, 15.
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"This [state regulation under the New Order] is
the challenge which has been presented to the insur-
ance industry and to the states. Leadership in business
and in government can keep enterprise free if leader-
ship is unselfish enough, courageous enough, and vigi-
lant enough to do it. By the Act of March 9, 1945 [the
McCarran Act], the government at Washington has
laid the problem in the laps of the states and of the
industry. It is theirs to make or to break. You can
keep the insurance industry free, and when you do you
will be setting an example for all business and all
government in every other branch of our economy."
The years will write the final story.
